BANGKOK, Thailand -- When Barack Obama became the first American
	president to visit communist Laos on Sept. 6-8, he arrived in the most
	heavily bombed country on earth where people continue to perish from
	U.S. explosives dropped during a war which ended more than 40 years
	ago.
	   President Obama's trip to Laos is seen by some as Washington's
	effort to woo Southeast Asia away from China's embrace.
	   He had bilateral meetings with Lao President Bounnhang Vorachith,
	who was promoted from the vice presidency in January when several
	other top leaders shifted, prompting speculation that Vientiane wants
	to ease away from financial dependence on Beijing and revitalize
	traditional ties with Hanoi.
	   In 1975, Washington lost its "secret war" in Laos -- along with
	similar defeats in Cambodia and Vietnam that same year when communists
	achieved victories across Indochina.
	   "Obama's diplomatic visit to Vientiane certainly isn't the time,
	nor the place, to find value or fault in anything the U.S.A. did in
	Laos," said James "Mule" Parker in an interview.
	   Mr. Parker, 73, was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
	paramilitary case officer in Laos during 1971-73 and authored several
	books about his experiences including Codename Mule and his newest
	titled, The Vietnam War Its Ownself.
	   In Laos, he fought alongside anti-communist Lao General Vang Pao's
	thousands of ethnic Hmong guerrillas, plus the Lao army and 4,000 U.S.
	Special Forces-trained Thai "Tiger Soldiers" (Tahan Sua Pran) against
	"invading" communist Vietnamese.
	   North Vietnam had constructed a strategic "Ho Chi Minh Trail"
	through the jungle in Laos, moving weapons and troops to attack
	U.S.-backed South Vietnam while securing Hanoi's sanctuary in
	northeast Laos in the Plain of Jars.
	   The CIA's mountain-based Hmong were animists with no written
	language and fought well, but were mostly abandoned by Washington when
	the U.S. retreated.
	   "That's ancient history," Mr. Parker said. "We have, with this
	[Obama] visit, an opportunity to signal to the world our friendship
	and interest in an invigorated way ahead for our two countries.
	   "That sounds like bullshit, but Laos is a fantastic tourist
	destination, and Americans should be encouraged to visit," said Mr.
	Parker, who also fought in Vietnam in 1965.
	   The former CIA officer's experience includes then-secretive
	fighting by Thailand's forces in Laos, which affected Bangkok's
	relations with Vientiane and Hanoi for many years.
	   President Obama's visit may also be able to turn a page on some of
	that past killing, and allow a new perspective on Thailand's role in
	the war and how Bangkok also can best go forward to improve relations
	with Vientiane.
	   "In 1951, a CIA paramilitary case officer named Bill Lair came to
	Thailand and was given the job of training some Thai Border Police as
	a ready reaction force, to counter communist incursions across the
	Thai borders," Mr. Parker said.
	   "You might remember Thailand was completely surrounded by
	communists at the time, and there was some fear that the Chinese would
	come pouring across the border to the north [in Thailand], like they
	had in November of 1950 in Korea.
	   "This force that Bill Lair created -- called PARU (Border Patrol
	Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit) -- was to act as the Thai vanguard
	against this kind of thing.  To jump into the area, if need be, and
	rally local Thais in support of efforts to fight off invading
	communists.
	   "In December 1960, one of outgoing [U.S.] President Eisenhower's
	last acts was to sign an authorization for the CIA to organize and
	train Hmong around the PDJ [Plain of Jars] to fight the [Lao]
	communists that had taken up residence in the area after [1960 Lao
	coup leader] Kong Le's unsuccessful effort to capture Vientiane.
	   "Bill Lair met with Vang Pao and came to an agreement on this
	military blocking action, that included assignment of CIA case
	officers to Pa Dong [Laos] to support and help organize the Hmong hill
	tribe, and the assignment of PARU forces to train them in guerrilla
	tactics and marksmanship," Mr. Parker said.
	   After 1968, North Vietnamese troops displayed their increasing
	strength "inside northeast Laos, and they constituted more of a force
	than Vang Pao's rag-tag army of hill tribes could handle," he said.
	   "So the Thais pitched in, first with regular army troops, who
	really got their nose bloodied out at Ban Na [Laos] fighting the NVA
	[North Vietnamese Army] 165th combat regiment of the 312th division in
	the 1970-1971 dry season.
	   "I joined the CIA as a contract Special Operations Group
	paramilitary case officer in August 1970, and in November 1971 was
	assigned to the Lao program, initially working as a desk officer in
	Udorn," in northern Thailand.
	   "I transferred up to Long Tieng [Laos] in early 1972 where I worked
	as a paramilitary case officer with the Hmong guerrillas.  My call
	sign was Mule.
	   "Through an agreement worked out primarily between the U.S.
	military, the Thai military and the CIA, a group that was called the
	Tahan Sua Pran or 'Tiger Soldiers' were recruited off the streets of
	Bangkok -- but really throughout Thailand -- and trained by U.S.
	Special Forces, mostly in the Thai province of Kanchanaburi, and sent
	north.
	   "But they were the Thai King's own.  He told them to put a small
	piece of gold on the back side of the Buddhas they wore around their
	necks, to indicate their personal, private bond to him.  And he told
	them in their difficult work ahead to use the words to the American
	song, 'The Impossible Dream' as their guide.
	   "The Thai office that controlled this activity was called '333.'
	The units were to be 550 men in size -- 500 soldiers recruited off
	Thailand's city streets and rice paddies, and 50 officers and NCO
	[non-commissioned officers] who were taking special assignments out of
	their RTA [Royal Thai Army] careers," he said.
	   Thai forces initially scored successes against the North Vietnamese
	but eventually suffered in and around the Plain of Jars.
	   "The NVA campaign 'Z' attacked by the tens of thousands on 18
	December [1971], and in two days all Thai irregular positions were
	overrun.
	   "Many good soldiers were lost, including almost the entire [Thai]
	BC 609, who at the end were calling in artillery on their own
	position," he said.
	   Heavy fighting continued in the Plain of Jars.
	   "Battle went on for 100 days" before the North Vietnamese
	retreated, "beaten badly by Vang Pao's rag-tag army, and U.S. air, and
	the Tahan Sua Pran.   One of the great, and least known victories of
	allied forces in the Vietnam War.
	   "So here's my point, if you mention these brave men, you do not
	describe them as 'mercenaries' or 'CIA-financed Thai police commandos'
	or 'CIA trained.'  They were Tahan Sua Pran, the King's own," he said.
	   "From my two years there, I saw no tragedies against Laos.  I saw
	raw, undisguised communist aggression that was bravely blunted by
	local Lao mountain men.
	   "In my time, Laos was a battlefield of Asians fighting Asians.  If
	U.S. air [bombing] is to be mentioned, it should come after
	acknowledgement that North Vietnam invaded Laos, never out of context.
	To classify our [U.S.] participation as tragedies just isn't right or
	fair," Mr. Parker said.
	   After Laos, he handled CIA agents and military reports in South
	Vietnam in 1973-75 before returning to the CIA's headquarters in
	Langley, Virginia, and then doing "traditional CIA Directorate of
	Operations work as a spy recruiter and handler...around the world
	until the end of the Cold War and my retirement in 1992.
	   "I returned to work as a CIA annuitant after 9/11 and worked
	through 2011 both at headquarters and overseas, including several
	deployments to Afghanistan.  Altogether I worked 32 years undercover,
	for the most part overseas," Mr. Parker said.
	   "During my career, I received the Intelligence Medal of Merit, a
	Certificate of Distinction, and two Certificates of Exceptional
	Service."
	   Laos became "the CIA's largest covert ops," he said, but the war
	involved Thailand's forces because of convoluted, personalized reasons
	-- after a battle complete with colored scarfs.
	   In 1960, a Lao military captain, Kong Le, and his unit "had not
	been paid in some time, and he had other gripes with the government
	that prompted him to move his unit in force to occupy the capital city
	[Vientiane]," Mr. Parker said.
	   "He claimed to be a neutralist, not western-aligned or tied in with
	the communist elements in Laos and North Vietnam.  Neutral.  However
	the suspicion was that he was getting support, or at least
	encouragement, from North Vietnam.
	   "General Phoumi Nosovanh, the U.S.-backed leader from southern
	Laos, brought his forces up to counter the renegade Kong Le, and an
	artillery battle for Vientiane ensued.  Interestingly, there was
	another Lao general who got involved.
	   "Each of the three groups identified themselves with distinctively
	colored scarfs. And since the battle was mostly by indirect fire, the
	soldiers on the ground were scurrying around from hiding place to
	hiding place, and the only way the locals knew who was controlling
	their area was to check out the scarfs the troops were wearing.
	   "So after a day or two, locals just bought scarfs of all three
	colors so they could pick the right one to wear when a different
	groups occupied their neighborhood.
	   "A sizeable number of civilians were killed, I forgot the number,
	but I don't think that many soldiers from the three groups," Mr.
	Parker said.
	   CIA paramilitary case officer "Bill Lair brought some of his [Thai]
	PARU up, and made significant contributions to General Phoumi
	Nosovanh's efforts. After several days, Kong Le's forces pulled back
	out of the Vientiane environment. I'm not sure why. Maybe they were
	running low on ammo."
	   After several days, Kong Le "moved on to the Plain of Jars, where
	they were resupplied by Russian planes coming in from Hanoi.  Also
	some North Vietnamese soldiers were coming in on those Soviet
	transport planes, in addition to Soviet journalists.  One of the
	journalists told someone that it was just a short matter of time
	before the communists ruled Laos, and that they could do it now if the
	Soviets wanted."
	   Kong Le's forces pushed General Vang Pao's fighters out of the
	area, prompting the CIA to deepen its involvement.
	   "Bill Lair ran him [General Vang Pao] down and talked with him
	about doing something to blunt the Kong Le and communist forces
	setting up shop on the Plain of Jars.  Vang Pao said, 'Hell yeah, give
	me some guns and some training and maybe a little helicopter support
	now and again, and I'll fight them fuckers'."
	   Senior CIA officials were impressed with General Vang Pao and "told
	Bill [Lair] to get together some of his PARU, and be prepared to lend
	support to Vang Pao in the way of taking on them commie squatters [who
	were] new to the Plain of Jars."
	   As a result, U.S. President Eisenhower signed "a covert ops
	approval to support 'locals' against the communist outlanders in
	Laos," Mr. Parker said.
	   "The rest is history. But here you got that Russian journalist
	saying, 'This land is our land,' in one week and Vang Pao's rag-tag
	forces kicking them out within a few months.
	   "So I leave it to you to describe who the enemy was exactly.  Kong
	Le, by the way, just gradually faded away [and departed] Laos for
	France before coming to the U.S., where he died a few years ago."
	   As for Thailand's Tahan Sua Pran, "they went in [Laos] knowing that
	it was a secret endeavor, and they still hold to that, it's part of
	the unit's mystique," he said.
	   "But back in the day, their involvement was Top Secret.  It took me
	two years to get The Vietnam War Its Ownself and the Battle for
	Skyline Ridge cleared through the CIA, because I mentioned their
	significant involvement in fighting the North Vietnamese at Ban Na,
	Plain of Jars, and Skyline.
	   "It is only recently that their gallant service has become known."
	   While President Obama tried to put the past behind, he came under
	pressure to push Laos into improving human rights.
	   "As the first-ever sitting U.S. president to visit Laos, President
	Obama should recognize his voice will carry particular weight with his
	Lao government hosts -- and he should use that leverage to demand Laos
	stop behaving like a tin-pot dictatorship and halt its systematic
	suppression of its people’s rights," said Phil Robertson, Asia
	division deputy director for New York-based Human Rights Watch.
	   "Laos is a one-party dictatorship with a horrible human rights
	record, where official impunity to abuse people is pretty much
	absolute.  It's a highly corrupt country, where national resources are
	being sold off to unscrupulous investors just to line relevant
	government officials' pockets," Mr. Robertson, based in Bangkok, said
	in an interview on August 29.
	   In Laos, President Obama's visit included attendance at a
	U.S.-ASEAN Summit which groups Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
	Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam in the
	Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
	   Mr. Obama also attended an East Asia Summit in Laos along with
	China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Russia.
	   His visit came after his Sept. 2-6 China trip to attend a G20
	summit in Hangzhou and meet Chinese President Xi Jinping.
	   His China and Laos trip is part of "the U.S. rebalance to Asia and
	the Pacific," the White House press secretary said on August 18.
	   Impoverished Laos -- landlocked by China, Vietnam, Cambodia,
	Thailand and Myanmar -- appears to be trying to leverage its
	geographical position to get the best possible investments and
	financial aid by balancing its relations among foreign political and
	economic interests and working those rivalries.
	   Billions of dollars worth of recent Chinese investment is involved
	in construction projects, real estate, hotels, shopping malls, Mekong
	River security, anti-narcotics programs, casinos, the mining industry,
	agriculture and other sectors.
	   The U.S. offers scant investment but provides millions of dollars
	financing anti-opium crop projects, clearance of its unexploded bombs,
	child care, education, Mekong waterway rehabilitation and other
	programs.
	   The Pentagon's links "with the Lao military are negligible," said
	Murray Hiebert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
	in Washington.
	   "The Lao military has agreed to work with Washington on some
	English-language training for its soldiers, but has not accepted the
	offer to send officers to U.S. staff colleges," Mr. Hiebert wrote in
	February.
	   While analysts perceive competition between China and the U.S. in
	Laos, a deeper role in Vientiane's stance has been played by Vietnam
	thanks to ties knotted in blood during the U.S-Indochina War.
	   For many years after the war, 40,000 Vietnamese soldiers were
	stationed in Laos, and Hanoi wielded influence over Vientiane's
	foreign affairs, defense and other policies.
	   Capitalist Bangkok is also actively eyeing mountainous Laos's
	hydroelectric dam projects which promise excess electricity will be
	sold to energy-hungry Thailand.
	   Washington meanwhile helps clear unexploded ordnance (UXO) which
	remains from intense U.S. bombing raids during the war, peppering the
	countryside and still killing men, women and children each year.
	   "America has long been the biggest donor to the UXO sector in Laos,
	and has continued year-on-year to increase the amount of funding that
	it provides to ensure [safe] land release can take place, and the
	victims of UXO accidents receive the support that they require," Simon
	Rea, country director for England-based Mines Advisory Group in Laos
	which clears UXO, said in an interview on August 29.
	   "From 1964 to 1973, the U.S. dropped more than two million tons of
	ordnance on Laos during 580,000 bombing missions -- equal to a
	planeload of bombs every 8 minutes, 24 hours a day, for 9 years --
	making Laos the most heavily bombed country per capita in history,"
	Washington-based Legacies of War said in a statement.
	   "Up to a third of the bombs dropped did not explode, leaving Laos
	contaminated...over 20,000 people have been killed or injured by UXO
	in Laos since the bombing ceased," Legacies of War said.
	   America's anti-communist involvement in Laos began in the late
	1950s when then-President Dwight Eisenhower passed his ideological
	fears to newly elected President John F. Kennedy in 1961.
	   "The Laos war turned the CIA into a military organization," Joshua
	Kurlantzick, a Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations Fellow
	for Southeast Asia, wrote in March.
	   After the war, Laos tightened relations with Vietnam and the Soviet
	Union, two nations which assisted it during the conflict.
	   Thailand, China and others eventually sought to also exploit
	natural resources in the lightly populated country of seven million
	people.
	   In a public relations effort, the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane on
	August 29 invited Twitter users to express opinions about President
	Obama's visit.
	   "If you had a chance to talk to the #POTUS about #Laos, what would
	you tell him? #ObamaLaos," the embassy's official @usembassyvte site
	said.
	   "1. We remember the U.S. genocide in Laos," replied @HikariSam, an
	"expat" who enjoyed "decades in exotic Asia" and is "tired of dumb
	ill-informed warmongering western societies."
	   "2. Clean up the UXBs USA left in Laos," he added.
	   "3. NO U.S. bases in Laos."